Do Korean Mergers Create Value for Shareholders? : Evidence from mergers between public firms
- 주제(키워드) Merger , Synergy , Information asymmetry , Agency problem
- 발행기관 고려대학교 대학원
- 지도교수 나현승
- 발행년도 2023
- 학위수여년월 2023. 8
- 학위구분 석사
- 학과 대학원 경영학과
- 원문페이지 36 p
- UCI I804:11009-000000276610
- DOI 10.23186/korea.000000276610.11009.0000125
- 본문언어 영어
초록/요약
This paper examines the market reaction and its determinants from mergers between listed firms in Korea. The sample contains 54 mergers between listed firms from 2000 to 2022 based on the SDC Platinum database. We examine the percent and won returns of bidders and targets, also the value-weighted synergy returns. Both percent and won returns of bidders and targets are significantly positive and the bidder return is significantly higher than that of the target. We find that the target firms with a high pre-merger run-up of bidder and target have significantly lower merger announcement returns. This result suggests that if the target or bidder is likely to be overvalued, the market tends to react negatively to the target’s merger announcement. Moreover, we find bidder firms whose controlling shareholders’ ownership of their target firm is higher, tend to have lower merger announcement returns. However, we find that there is no significant evidence that chaebol-affiliated mergers have lower CARs.
more목차
I. Introduction………………………………………………...……...…………….………….……1
II. Data and Methodology………………………………………………….…………….……….…6
1. Sample………………………………………………………………………………...………6
2. Definition……………………………………………………………..……………………….6
3. Summary statistics…………………………………………………………..………………...9
III. Empirical results…………………………………………………………………...……….…….9
1. Abnormal percentage and won returns………………………………………….……..............9
2. Abnormal percentage and won returns by affiliations between bidder and targets……….….11
3. Determinants of merger announcement returns…………………………………….………...13
IV. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………..…...15
References………………………………………………………………………………….…………18
Appendix…………………….………...…………………………………………………………...…2

