The School Admissions Problem with Students' Private Values
- 주제(키워드) School choice , College admissions problem
- 발행기관 고려대학교 대학원
- 지도교수 조원기
- 발행년도 2021
- 학위수여년월 2021. 2
- 학위구분 석사
- 학과 대학원 경제학과
- 세부전공 Economic Theory
- 원문페이지 40 p
- UCI I804:11009-000000234720
- DOI 10.23186/korea.000000234720.11009.0001192
- 본문언어 영어
- 제출원본 000046069185
초록/요약
We compare the centralized and decentralized school admissions problem in terms of students' equilibrium strategies and social welfare. Specifically, when students have their types for their values of the better school between two, we find the equilibrium efforts of students under the centralized school admissions (CSA) using the general method to solve an auction problem, and we also find the equilibrium cutoff application choice and effort under the decentralized school admissions (DSA). Then, we show that a student having a very low value for the better school prefers DSA to CSA, and find conditions where a student prefers DSA to CSA and a society prefers CSA to DSA.
more목차
Abstract
Contents
1 Introduction, 1
1.1 Related Literature, 4
2 The Model, 6
3 Equilibrium under the Centralized School Admission, 9
4 Equilibrium under the Decentralized School Admission, 12
5 Welfare Comparison, 19
6 Conclusion, 21
Appendices, 23
A Proof for the Centralized School Admission, 24
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1, 24
B Proofs for the Decentralized School Admission, 26
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2, 26
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3, 27
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2, 28
C Proofs for the Welfare Comparison, 30
C.1 Proof of Proposition 3, 30
C.2 Proof of Proposition 4, 32
References, 34
