Limitations and Preconditions in Transfer of South Korea's Wartime Operational Control
- 주제(키워드) 전시작전권 , 전작권 , OPCON , Operational Control
- 발행기관 고려대학교 국제대학원
- 지도교수 서창록
- 발행년도 2014
- 학위수여년월 2014. 8
- 학위구분 석사
- 학과 국제대학원 국제학과
- 원문페이지 61 p
- 실제URI http://www.dcollection.net/handler/korea/000000051864
- 본문언어 영어
- 제출원본 000045808676
초록/요약
Continuous provocations from North Korea since the end of the Cold War have shaped South Korea’s defense policy and its alliance cooperation with the United States. Similarly, a recent series of security incidents have invoked a necessity to consider a reevaluation of South Korea’s independent military capability in certain areas for an effective war-deterrence. In the defense ministerial meeting between the United States and South Korea on July 2013, hence, South Korea offered a deal for another delay in transfer of Operational Control of its troops in time of war, which originally dated on December 2015. South Korea’s Defense White Paper 2010 suggested command restructuring as well as enhancement of South Korea’s independent military capabilities. And its purpose of the change in control and persuading a more independent military role of South Korea could bring more stable security structure of Northeast Asian region. Thus, Strategic Alliance 2015, which established not only for an effective transfer of the wartime Operational Control (OPCON) but also for consolidation of U.S. bases into two hubs, tour normalization, and management of U.S. forces in Korea within broader, world- wide mission requirements had been purposed. For this reasons South Korea had initiated the capability improvement project to play an independent and expended role beyond the Korean Peninsula’s stability, and develop the ROK-U.S. alliance structure into a “comprehensive, dynamic and mutually beneficial alliance” for regional stability in Northeast Asia. Transfer of the wartime Operational Control (OPCON) from the U.S. and its implications not only for two Koreas but also for each regional stakeholder will determine the security structure of Northeast Asian region as a whole. Suggested analysis over the regional security structure under the theoretical framework and South Korea’s defense capabilities in certain areas will be provided to study the prerequisite conditions for a successful transfer of the wartime Operational Control (OPCON) for its own defense. Also, the role of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), which will be dissolved after the transfer of the wartime Operational Control (OPCON), should not be downplayed since its existence has become more essential nowadays for the stability in the region. Studied implications suggest that transfer of the wartime Operational Control (OPCON) should be not be delivered under the political motivations or blind patriotism. It should be proceeded under precise preparations under the strict timetable and considerable calibrations over its impact on future security structure in Northeast Asian region.
more목차
I. Introduction 1
II. Literature Review 5
2.1. Historical Background of Korea-U.S. Military Alliance 5
2.2. Recent Development over the Wartime Operational Control in South Korea 10
III. Theoretical Framework 17
IV. Recent Security Development in Korean Peninsula 22
4.1. Sinking of the South Korean Vessel Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Shelling 22
4.2. North Korea’s Missile and Nuclear Test 27
4.3. The Purge of Jang Song-taek 30
V. Limitations and Preconditions 32
5.1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 33
5.2. Nuclear Deterrence 37
5.3. Logistic and Landing Forces 40
VI. The Role of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command 43
VII. Conclusion 46
Bibliography 48
